Combining Averting Behavior and Contingent Valuation Data: an Application to Drinking Water Treatment by Rosado, Márcia A. et al.
Combining Averting Behavior and Contingent Valuation Data: An Application 
to Drinking Water Treatment 
 
Marcia A. Rosado∗, Maria A. Cunha-e-Sá, Maria M. Ducla-Soares, and Luís C. Nunes 
Department of Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Travessa Estevão Pinto, Lisbon, 
1099-032, Portugal 
 
Abstract. This paper is an empirical application that combines averting behavior 
with contingent valuation data.  Consistency tests are performed incorporating 
alternative heteroscedastic structures in the bivariate probit models by taking 
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We look at three covariates not yet examined in the literature when combining stated 
and revealed preferred data to explain the variance in the models: income, the bid in 
the contingent valuation questionnaire, and the distance between the bid and the 
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and within data sources heteroscedasticity. The results obtained allow the 
combination of the two data sources under a common preference structure.  
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1. Introduction  
The combination of stated (survey) and revealed (real market) preference data 
has been used to better understand preferences.  In the context of the environmental 
economics literature, Cameron (1992) and Adamowicz, Louviere, and Williams 
(1994), amongst others, set up the basis for a new approach to non-market valuation 
which combines revealed and stated information to estimate a joint model.  These 
studies provide insights into strategies for pooling stated preferred (SP) and revealed 
preferred (RP) data, validate the approach, and show the advantages of pooling SP 
and RP data, i.e., improved efficiency in estimations, reduction of multicollinearity, 
and extension of the range of data beyond that available from RP data. 
However, Huang, Haab, and Whitehead (1997) show that RP and SP data 
should not be pooled assuming a common preference structure unless both decisions 
yield the same change in behavior caused by the quality change.  Therefore, when 
pooling the two sets of data under a single preference structure one has to examine 
whether both sets of data are consistent or not.  Prior to performing consistency tests, 
it is essential to improve the specification of the systematic and the transitory parts of 
the models within each data source. 
Ben-Akiva and Morikawa (1990), Swait and Louviere (1993), and 
Adamowicz et al. (1994) emphasize the role of the scale parameter as a mean to 
compare different data sources in the context of MNL choice models.  More recently, 
there is a growing interest in explaining heteroscedasticity structures within data 
sources. In particular, accounting for specific sources of heteroscedasticity using 
parametrised heteroscedastic models may improve significantly our understanding of 
 2
the underlying decision process. The majority of the studies that can be included in 
this line of research explore sources of variability that are present in both RP and SP 
data.  Swait and Adamowicz (1997) and Hensher, Louviere, and Swait (1999) should 
be mentioned in this context. Swait and Adamowicz (1997) model heteroscedasticity 
as a function of entropy, a measure of uncertainty inherent in the choice 
environment.  While their entropy measure takes into account task demand 
characterized by the number of alternatives available and the correlation structure of 
the attributes, other sources of variation intrinsic in SP data generated by contingent 
valuation surveys were not examined.  In the contingent valuation literature, 
Alberini, Kanninen, and Carson (1997) show how to specify heteroscedasticity to 
capture variability caused by the distance between willingness to pay and the cost 
amount presented in dichotomous choice contingent valuation surveys. 
Significant research has been done combining RP and SP data  (Cameron 
1992; Adamowicz et al. 1994; McConnell, Weninger, and Strand 1999; Herriges, 
Kling, and Azevedo 1999), but none of these studies combine averting behavior and 
contingent valuation data sets.  We contribute to the growing literature on data 
combination by combining averting behavior, RP, and SP data. In addition to 
including income and cost as sources of heteroscedasticity when combining data 
sources, we account for a source of variance intrinsic in contingent valuation surveys. 
In particular, we examine whether the distance between treatment costs and the bid 
significantly affects the variance of the error as in Alberini et al (1997).  We examine 
whether these sources of heteroscedasticity play a significant role when testing for 
consistency between RP and SP data sources.  Our findings indicate that 
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incorporating income as a source of variance generates more accurate models than 
those with the other two sources of variation. More importantly, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis of taste parameter equality across averting behavior and SP data.  These 
findings hold in models where we account for correlation between averting behavior 
and SP data. 
The remainder of this paper is divided as follows.  Section two describes the 
survey.  Section three presents the theoretical model. Section four has the empirical 
model, including the sources of heteroscedasticity. Section five discusses the results, 
and section six concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. The Survey 
The households were interviewed in 1996 in an urban area of the state of 
Espírito Santo, Brazil.  The surveys were conducted under the auspices of the 
Espírito Santo Company of Sanitation (CESAN) for the World Bank.  Enumerators 
attempted to interview nine hundred and thirty-two households, but only nine 
hundred and seventeen participated.  Seven hundred and ninety-one observations are 
used in the estimations of the dichotomous choice models1. The survey reveals 
socioeconomic information about the household, such as income, number of 
children, etc.  It also investigates how households treated water for drinking 
consumption based on their averting behavior.  Variable costs incurred (VCOST) 
with drinking water treatment were constructed based on the answers to the averting 
behavior questions2.  VCOST took on different values depending on the treatment 
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method adopted (filter, boiling, or purchase of bottled water).  For households not 
treating drinking water, VCOST was calculated as the average of the costs of the 
different treatment methods.  Seventy-nine percent of the households examined here 
treated drinking water. 
However, only nineteen percent of the households agreed to pay for drinking 
water treatment in the contingent valuation study. The contingent valuation question 
for the work presented in this paper was stated as follows: 
 
Now, I will ask if you are willing to pay an extra fee with your water billing 
statement to have tap water treated for drinking purposes3.  This way you will not 
have to buy bottled water, filter, or boil the water.  You will only have to turn the 
water on and drink.  I would like to tell you that there is not a right or wrong way 
to answer this question.  You should remember other expenses you have to see if 
you have the money to pay for this service.  It is important that you answer what 
you really think.  If you and other people say that you are not willing to pay any 
amount, it can be that it will not be possible to offer an efficient system.  If you say 
you can pay a lot, it can be that you will not have the money to pay the bill. 
Would you pay an extra $__C__ added  every month to your water billing 
statement to be able to drink tap water without having to filter or boil the water? 
0. No  1.Yes  2. Don’t know 
 
The following amounts (C)  $3, $6, $12, $20, $26, $32, $38, $42, $48, and 
$52 were randomly assigned to the respondents in the contingent valuation 
experiment.  
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3. Theoretical Model 
iZe 5θσ =
Each household i chooses between treating drinking water and spending an 
amount equal to VCOSTi  or not treating.  This decision is modeled using the 
averting behavior data.  Using the contingent valuation approach, household i 
chooses between having treated water and paying a fee equal to Ci  or not having 
treated drinking water.  For the RP data set, let equal 1 if household i treats water 
and 0 otherwise. For the SP data set, let equal 1 if household i answers “yes” and 
0 otherwise. Also, let COST
r
iy
s
iy
i
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where k = r,s denotes the data set, RP or SP, respectively. The  j=0,1, denote 
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It is possible that the random component from the averting expenditure 
decision, , is correlated with the one from contingent valuation, .  Ignoring the 
correlation between the RP and the SP data may cause biased coefficients.  In order 
to allow correlation between SP and RP responses, we consider a bivariate probit 
model, as in McConnell et al. (1999).  Assuming that 
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the log-likelihood function is given by (Greene 1997): 
( )*2 ,, irisi ww ρΦ
( )∑
=
Φ=
n
i
i
s
i
r
i wwL
1
*
2 ,,,lnln)4( ρ  
where , , and  ki
k
i
k
i sqw = ρρ sirii qq=* .12 −= kiki yq
 7
It is not possible to identify all parameters  and 
separately.  The common normalizing assumption is to set  and 
estimate the remaining parameters.  
,,,,,, rsrsr σργγδδ
sσ 1== sr σσ
Consistency between the SP and RP data sets requires the indirect utility 
functions to be the same. Therefore, the parameters across utility functions should be 
equal to each other:  and .  In this case, again, it is not possible to 
identify all parameters separately. A possible normalization is to set  and 
estimate the remaining parameters. Thus, the model accounts for between-data 
source heteroscedasticity.  In order to allow within-data source heteroscedastic 
structures of the error term, we reparameterize variances as follows: 
sr δδ = sr γγ =
1=rσ
( )rir Wexp)5( θσ =ri    
                   and  
( )sis Wexp)6( θλσ +=si , 
where Wik denotes a vector of variables causing within-data heteroscedasticity, and 
θk is a vector of the corresponding coefficients for each data set k (k=r or s).  The 
parameter λ takes into account between-data heteroscedasticity. 
 
 
4.0  Incorporating Heteroscedasticity in the Bivariate Probit Models 
            In order to test for consistency, five sets of bivariate probit models are 
estimated.  Each set consists of an unrestricted and a restricted model.  In the 
unrestricted models, the parameters from the averting behavior model are allowed to 
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differ from those in the SP model while in the restricted models some parameters in 
both models, RP and SP, are set equal to each other.   
            The deterministic part of the indirect utility includes INC, CONNEC, 
INFAN, HSORMORE, COST, and a constant as regressors (Table I): 
 
( ) HSORMOREINFANCONNECCOSTINCV KKkkkkk 11111)7( βτηδα +++−+=  
 and 
,)8( 00000 HSORMOREINFANCONNECINCV
KKkkkk βτηδα ++++=  
 
where INFAN is a dummy variable indicating whether children five years old or 
younger are present in the household.  If there are infants in the household, 
INFAN=1, otherwise INFAN=0.  CONNEC is also a dummy variable taking on the 
value of one if the household is connected to the water utility and zero otherwise. 
HSORMORE is another dummy variable taking the value of one if the head of the 
household has at least some high-school training and zero otherwise. COSTk is equal 
to VCOST if k=r and equal to C if k=s, where VCOST represents variable costs 
incurred with drinking water treatment, and C is the valuation bid from the 
contingent valuation exercise.  INC represents monthly household income. 
The bivariate probit models are characterized by different heteroscedastic 
structures of the error term.  While in model set i, the restricted model is estimated 
only with between data heteroscedasticity, within-data source heteroscedasticity is 
allowed in all of the other model sets. 
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Let µik=1/σik represent the scale functions in the estimated models, which is 
the usual approach to combining SP and RP data (Adamowicz et al. 1994;  Swait and 
Louviere 1993). 
In model set i, the scale functions are defined as follows: 
λ
µµ
e
and si
r
i
11)9( ==  
In model set ii, we have the following scale functions: 
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Ci is a bid randomly assigned to household i in the willingness-to-pay question.  
Halvorsen and Saelensminde (1998) model variance as a function of cost to account 
for heteroscedasticity inherent in random valuation models.  We simply try to 
account for variance as a function of a characteristic of the alternative.  A positive θ3 
(negative θ3) indicates that households that face high bids are more heterogeneous 
(less heterogeneous) than those facing lower bids.  
In model set iii, the scale functions are: 
.11)11(
4 iZ
s
i
r
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e
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iii CVCOSTZ −=  where VCOSTi indicates the cost household i faces when 
deciding whether or not to treat drinking water.  Adjusting Alberini et al. (1997) 
modelling of heteroscedasticity to the context of a random utility model, we assume 
that when the respondent compares the utility he/she would get with or without the 
service offered in the contingent valuation questionnaire, the respondent may anchor 
the bid offered on an average market cost, represented here by VCOST, of providing 
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treated drinking water.  If VCOST and the bid are far apart, the unexpected high or 
low bid value can be seen as unrealistic, making the respondent confused. Thus, 
respondents will be more heterogeneous than when VCOST and the bid are closer.  
Therefore we expect θ4 > 0.  
In model set iv, the scale functions are 
ii INC
s
iINC
r
i e
and
e 21
11)12( θλθ µµ +==  
The two coefficients (θ1,θ2) will be positive (negative) if the better off households 
have preferences that are more heterogeneous (less heterogeneous) than those of the 
worse off households.  
In the case of model set v, we have 
iiii ZCINC
s
iINC
r
i e
and
e 4321
11)13( θθθλθ µµ +++==  
Model set v includes all types of within SP data heteroscedasticity previously 
examined, within RP data variance caused by INC, and the parameter related to the 
average scale difference between data sources (λ). 
[TABLE I] 
 
5. Results 
Table II and Table III present the results from the bivariate probit estimations 
for each model set described in section four.  Two bivariate probit models were 
estimated in each set.  The first estimation does not impose taste parameter equality 
across data sets and yields the results in the SP and RP columns.  The joint 
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estimation (RP/ SP column) constrains taste parameters from the RP and SP model to 
be equal to each other, except for the coefficients on CONNEC and HSORMORE, 
and estimates a coefficient related to the scale parameter (λ). 
Most of the estimated coefficients are significant at the 5% level.  Regarding 
the independent variables, the exceptions are as follows: the coefficients on INFAN 
in all of the SP models and in the joint models for model sets ii and iii, where they 
are significant at 10%, and the coefficients on HSORMORE in the SP models and 
joint models of sets iv and v.  Regarding the coefficients used to model 
heteroscedasticity, the coefficients on C, Z, and λ, the coefficient related to the scale 
factor, are not significant in set v. λ is also not significant in set iv, and the 
coefficient on Z is significant at 10% in set iii.  The correlation coefficients (ρ) are 
not significant in any of the models. 
The coefficients on INFAN are positive given that households with small kids 
are more likely to treat drinking water.  The coefficients on COST are negative 
indicating that as the cost of treating drinking water increases, the probability of 
choosing treatment goes down.  The coefficients on HSORMORE are positive 
indicating that the probability of choosing treatment increases for households with 
more schooling. The coefficient on CONNEC is negative in SP models probably 
because of strategic behavior.  Households not yet connected to the water utility 
(CONNEC=0) are more likely to accept the bid offered in the contingent valuation 
questionnaire in order to be connected to the water utility. 
Given that the coefficients on CONNEC have opposite signs in the SP and 
RP models and the coefficients on HSORMORE are much higher in the RP model, 
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we follow Hensher et al. (1999) and do not impose taste parameter equality across 
data sources for η and β. Thus, each joint model has two coefficient estimates for 
CONNEC and for HSORMORE. 
The positive coefficient on Ci (θ3) indicates that households facing high bids 
are more heterogeneous than those facing lower bids.  θ4 is positive because 
households get confused with bids that are far from VCOST.  Coefficients on INC 
(θ1, θ2) are positive indicating that the better off households have tastes that are more 
heterogeneous than those of the worse off households.  Even though θ3 and θ4 are 
significant when C and Z are the only covariates used to model heteroscedasticity 
(sets ii and iii), they loose their significance when INC is introduced (set v).  
Specifying heteroscedasticity with INC also eliminates between data source 
heteroscedasticity.  Thus, λ is no longer significant in sets iv and v. Swait and 
Adamowicz (1997) and Hensher et al. (1999) also have shown that introducing 
within-data source heteroscedasticity eliminates between-data source 
heteroscedasticity.   
The standard hypothesis on the pooled SP and RP data sources is represented 
by model set i.  In this case, the usual approach is to allow for average scale 
differences between SP and RP data.  Thus, we estimate λ.  The value of the scale 
function (scale factor, µs) is 1.31 when λ = -0.267.  In all sets, except for sets iv and 
v, the SP models have scale factors significantly different from one.  
            Performing likelihood ratio tests (Table IV), we conclude that the taste 
parameter equality hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 95% confidence level.  The 
chi-squared statistics are presented in Table IV. The critical value is 5.99 for two 
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degrees of freedom.  Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of parameter 
equality (and different variances), except for β and η, at the 95% confidence level.  
Thus, the combination of the two data sources can be undertaken under the 
assumption of a common preference structure.  As in Hensher et al. (1999), when all 
the parameters are constrained to be the same in the joint estimation it is not possible 
to accept the hypothesis that the two data sets are originated in a common underlying 
preference structure. 
Likelihood ratio tests comparing model set i to the other model sets and 
comparing model set iv to model set v indicate that income is the most important 
covariate in the modeling of heteroscedasticity.  The values for the unconstrained 
log-likelihood functions are used in the tests.  The likelihood ratio statistics and the 
respective null hypothesis from comparing model set i to the other model sets are: 
4.7 for set i x set ii (H0: θ3=0), 3.66 for set i x set iii (H0: θ4=0), 62.3 for set i x set iv 
(H0: θ1=θ2=0), and 63.24 for set i x set v (H0: θ1=θ2=θ3=θ4=0).  Therefore we reject 
the hypothesis that the coefficients on C, INC, and Z are equal to zero4.  The 
likelihood ratio statistics from comparing model sets iv and v is 0.94 and H0: 
θ3=θ4=0.  In this last case we can not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
on C and Z are significantly different from zero. 
 
[TABLE II] 
[TABLE III] 
[TABLE IV] 
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6. Conclusion 
        The novel combination of averting behavior and contingent valuation data 
presented in this paper contributes to the growing literature on pooling data sets.  We 
perform consistency tests to validate the combination of both data sets. 
        Bivariate probit models were estimated allowing for both between and within 
data sources heteroscedasticity.  We looked at three covariates not yet examined in 
the literature when combining SP and RP data to explain the variance in the models: 
income (INC), the bid in the contingent valuation questionnaire (C), and the distance 
between C and VCOST (Z).   
        When the sources of variance listed above were incorporated as well as when 
only the scale factor was included, the hypothesis of taste parameter equality across 
data sets, except for the parameters on HSORMORE and CONNEC, could not be 
rejected.  Thus, the consistency tests performed point to the existence of a common 
underlying preference structure behind the SP and the RP data sets across all models 
when a linear utility function is used. 
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Notes 
1. 917 questionnaires were collected.  126 were dropped for the following reasons.   
      98 questionnaires had one of the independent variables used in the estimations    
      missing.  17 households stated  “didn’t know”.  One of the households reported a  
      monthly income of $ 20,000 which was not credible given other characteristics of  
      this household.  Ten protest bids were also eliminated. 
 
2.   For a description of the construction of variable costs as well as a more detailed   
      description of the survey, see McConnell and Rosado (2000). 
 
3.   For household not yet connected to the water supply system, households were  
      told the following:  Now, I will ask if you are willing to pay a fee every month to  
      have tap water treated for drinking purposes. 
 
4.   H0: θ4=0 can be rejected only at the 10% significance level. 
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Table I. Variables used in the bivariate probit models 
Variable Description Mean  
INC Monthly household income $583 
VCOST Variable costs with drinking water treatment $10 
C Bid in the Contingent Valuation Questionnaire  $28 
INFAN Dummy variable equal to one if there are children 
five years old or younger in the household; 0 
otherwise 
31% 
Z Distance between VCOST and C $25 
CONNEC Dummy variable equal to one if household is 
already connected to the water utility; 0 otherwise 
86% 
HSORMORE Dummy variable equal to one if household has 
some high school or more schooling; 0 otherwise 
22% 
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Table II.  Parameter Estimates of Independent Variables from Unconstrained and Constrained Models (with correlation) 
            Model
Set i 
Model
Set ii 
Model
Set iii 
Model
Set iv 
   Model
Set v 
 
 RP 
(un
c) 
SP 
(unc) 
RP/SP 
(con) 
RP 
(unc) 
SP 
(unc) 
RP/SP 
(con) 
RP 
(unc) 
SP 
(unc) 
RP/SP 
(con) 
RP 
(unc) 
SP 
(unc) 
RP/SP 
(con) 
RP 
(unc) 
SP 
(unc) 
RP/SP 
(con) 
const. 
 
 
0.6
1 
(3.8
0) 
0.88 
(5.13) 
0.65 
(6.56) 
0.61 
(3.80) 
1.39 
(4.56) 
0.61 
(7.30) 
0.61 
(3.79) 
1.21 
(4.67) 
0.65 
(7.59) 
1.14 
(4.74) 
1.23 
(5.46) 
1.26 
(6.98) 
 
1.14 
(4.71) 
1.52 
(4.06) 
1.26 
(6.85) 
connec 
 
 
 
0.5
3 
(3.1
2) 
-1.00 
(-6.58) 
0.54 
(4.64) 
 
-0.77 
(-6.4) 
0.53 
(3.12) 
-1.30 
(-5.37) 
 
0.58 
(5.50) 
 
-0.61 
(-5.77) 
0.53 
(3.12) 
-1.22 
(-5.59) 
0.55 
(5.13) 
 
-0.68 
(-6.55) 
0.69 
(2.94) 
-1.35 
(-6.64) 
0.57 
(3.24) 
 
-1.49 
(-5.97) 
0.69 
(2.92) 
-1.51 
(-5.15) 
0.58 
(3.32) 
 
-1.37 
(-5.15) 
infan 
 
 
0.3
1 
(2.4
3) 
0.11 
(0.90) 
0.16 
(2.13) 
0.31 
(2.42) 
0.11 
(0.71) 
0.11 
(1.76) 
0.31 
(2.45) 
0.11 
(0.72) 
0.13 
(1.91) 
0.62 
(3.27) 
0.27 
(1.57) 
0.48 
(3.37) 
0.63 
(3.26) 
0.25 
(1.32) 
0.44 
(2.98) 
hsorm. 
 
 
1.4
0 
(8.8
9) 
0.37 
(2.56) 
1.40 
(8.98) 
 
0.27 
(2.55) 
1.40 
(8.87) 
0.46 
(2.38) 
1.40 
(8.98) 
 
0.20 
(2.37) 
1.4 
(8.93) 
0.37 
(2.0) 
1.4 
(9.01) 
 
0.20 
(2.1) 
1.62 
(6.57) 
0.05 
(0.20) 
1.60 
(6.59) 
 
0.52 
(0.16) 
1.62 
(6.53) 
0.11 
(0.40) 
1.60 
(6.56) 
 
0.07 
(0.26) 
vcost/c 
   
 
-
0.0
3 
(-
22.
17) 
-0.05 
(-11.83) 
-0.03 
(-22.34) 
 
-0.03 
(-22.13) 
-0.08 
(-4.68) 
-0.03 
(-22.36) 
-0.03 
(-22.07) 
-0.06 
(-6.19) 
-0.03 
(-22.21) 
-0.08 
(-11.88) 
-0.06 
(8.90) 
-0.08 
(-11.95) 
-0.08 
(-11.87) 
-0.08 
(-4.01) 
-0.08 
(-11.94) 
 
ρ 
       -0.01
(-0.05) 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
-0.01 -0.01 
(-0.08) (-0.09) 
-0.08
(-0.72) 
-0.07 
(-0.66) 
-0.07
(-0.54) 
-0.07 
(-0.61) 
 -0.06 
(-0.48) 
-0.07 
(-0.57) 
Note:  Numbers in parenthesis are t-ratios. 
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Table III.  Parameter Estimates of Variables Explaining Heteroscedasticity in Unconstrained and Constrained Models (with correlation) 
              Model
Set i 
Model
Set ii 
Model
Set iii 
Model
Set iv 
Model 
Set v 
 
 RP 
(unc) 
SP 
(unc) 
RP/SP 
(con) 
RP 
(unc) 
SP 
(unc) 
RP/SP 
(con) 
RP 
(unc) 
SP 
(unc) 
RP/SP 
(con) 
RP 
(unc) 
SP 
(unc) 
RP/SP 
(con) 
RP 
(unc) 
SP 
(unc) 
RP/SP 
(con) 
Inc 
θ1 
 
            0.001  
(8.16) 
0.001
(8.01) 
0.0007 
(8.14) 
0.0007
(7.97) 
Inc 
θ2 
 
           
            
            
            
0.0005 0.001 
(3.66) (3.68) 
0.0005 0.0005 
(3.36) (3.49) 
C 
θ3 
 
0.01
(2.50) 
0.01 
(2.10) 
0.007 0.004 
(0.66) (0.42) 
Z 
θ4 
 
0.01
(2.13) 
0.01 
(1.92) 
0.0004 0.0005 
(0.06) (0.06) 
λ -0.27 
(-2.76) 
 -0.75 
(-3.40) 
-0.57
(-3.30) 
0.19
(1.34) 
0.01
(0.05) 
Note:  Numbers in parenthesis are t-ratios. 
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Table IV.  Consistency Tests 
  Model             
Set i 
Model
Set ii 
Model
Set iii 
Model
Set iv 
Model
Set v 
 
Lc 
 
             -589.84  -588.24 -588.37 -558.68  -558.47
Lu 
 
             
            
             
             
-588.88  -586.53 -587.05 -557.73  -557.26
# Parameters 
(constrained) 
 
9  10  10 11  13
# Parameters 
(unconstrained) 
 
11 12  12 13  15
Likelihood  
Ratio 
Test 
1.92 3.42  2.64 1.90  2.42
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